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Abstract 
 
Taxis suffer a high rate of crashes, as is borne out by claims on third party insurance.  
Consequences of crashes are compounded for a taxi, as it means at least one driver and 
investors lose income, passengers may be injured, and the reputation of taxis as a safe 
conveyance diminished.  The taxi industry has a complex structure; the main entities are the 
taxi company, taxi depot, taxi owner, taxi driver, and taxi license owner.  For any taxi the five 
entities may be the same, different, or any one of the combinations in between and this 
complexity may be detrimental to enhancing safety.  The current study explores the causes of 
taxi crashes and trials suitable interventions to reduce crash rates.  Other than a tendency to 
blame other taxi drivers, or other drivers, the most often cited safety issue was paying 
attention, “be psychic, see four cars ahead”.  The Queensland Taxi Driver Questionnaire has 
been trialled and several initial observations made.  Taxi drivers who purposely sped on 
residential streets were more likely to crash and to have incurred demerit points.  While these 
results provide evidence that speed cameras are valid, other results point to “being in a rush” 
as the critical factor: Taxi drivers who try to get their passenger to a destination on time, 
regardless of the road rules, are more likely to crash, by contrast, taxi drivers who give safety 
of passengers a priority were less likely to crash.  On the evidence of this initial pilot study, 
the questionnaire has been revised and is currently in distribution to a larger population of 
drivers.  Industry factors are incorporated in the questionnaire informed by the theory of 
planned behaviour.  Early in 2006 a magnetic pen operated computer used to assess drivers 
will be trialled with both novice and experienced taxi drivers. 
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Taxis suffer a high rate of crashes, as is borne out by claims on third party insurance.  
In Queensland in the 2000/01 financial year there was, on average, 80 third party insurance 
claims per 1000 taxis (based on data from Motor Accident Insurance Commission obtained 
from L. Russell, personal communication, 7 May 2004), compared to a rate of less than 5 
claims per 1000 cars.  There are also the crashes where there are no third party casualties.  A 
major reason for high crash rates will be the amount of time taxis are on the road and thus 
exposed to the possibility of crashing.  A typical taxi in Brisbane will be driven for about 150 
000 kilometres per year, most of which are on urban streets, that is, at lower speeds and so for 
longer time than if the vehicle was driven on a highway.   
Consequences of crashes are compounded for a taxi compared to private cars.  For 
both taxis and private vehicles crashes may result in injury and occasionally death, time lost 
due to police investigations, processing insurance claims and organising repairs, and 
inconvenience such as greater difficulty in travelling to work or shops.  A taxi involved in a 
crash also results in the driver losing time in which to earn income, and may lose his or her 
livelihood if the licence is suspended or cancelled, or if the depot manager or taxi owner 
refuses to hire a cab to the driver.  Other drivers may also lose access to the cab if it is off the 
road.  There is also an increase in costs for the industry, including insurance, repair, or write-
off costs, and associated administration costs.  At least one depot found it cost effective to 
write-off any cab that would be out of action for more than a day and a half (unless otherwise 
stated, reference to depot managers and cab drivers are the result of personal communications 
between the first author and industry members during the period from July2004 and 
November 2005).   A number of depot managers claimed that the occasional big crash, while 
unwanted, was easier to deal with than the stream of minor crashes and scrapes which was a 
constant drain on time, money, and energy.  This is somewhat contrary to the primary 
concerns in the road safety field, which is to reduce fatal and serious injury crashes 
(Queensland Transport, 2003).  
One aim of this study is to explore the causes of taxi crashes.  However, crashes do 
not happen in an organisational or social vacuum.  Factors that affect regular drivers may 
differ from factors that affect taxi drivers, though there is likely to be many common factors.  
For example, whilst driving under the influence of alcohol is considered one of the “fatal 4” 
(Queensland Transport, 2003), because taxi drivers are professional drivers they have stricter 
alcohol limits, alcohol may not be a factor in their crashes.  However, because taxi drivers 
spent long hours on the road, fatigue may be a fatal 4 factor that is particularly pertinent for 
taxi drivers. The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB, Ajzen, 1985, 1991) shall be utilised to 
provide a relatively simple structure to the many influences on taxi driving behaviour.  This 
study also has the aim of finding ways of reducing crash rates.  An apparently simple 
objective of crash reduction quickly becomes quite complex when individual differences of 
drivers, and their organisational, social, and road environments, are taken into account. A 
computer based driver assessment and feedback tool, and the proposed evaluation of this 
assessment tool, shall be described. 
 
The Taxi Driver in the Organisational Environment 
 
The main entities in the taxi organisation are the company, the depot, the cab owner, 
the driver, and the taxi license owner. The taxi company provides the communication base for 
both drivers and customers, determines the taxi livery and basic standards for drivers, trains 
drivers, provides a booking service, and provides emergency communication for drivers.  
Many taxis are operated out of a depot.  Depots will look after the rostering of drivers, the 
pay-in of fares, and the maintenance and repair of the taxis.  A depot may have some cars that 
are changed over, or garaged, at a driver’s residence.  The taxi owner is the person or 
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company that actually owns or leases the taxi vehicle, and may be the depot, taxi company, or 
another entity.  Each taxi vehicle must be linked to a taxi licence.  Taxi licences may be 
owned by someone quite independent of the industry who leases the licence to the taxi owner 
as an investment. 
Taxi drivers are not employees, but bailees.  Essentially, they receive use of a taxi in 
return for paying a share of the fares to the operator: the driver usually retains about 45% of 
the fares.  The bailor-bailee contract appears to be quite unique and different from contracts 
enjoyed by contract workers in other industries, where the worker is paid for a set amount of 
work.  In the taxi industry, the driver pays the operator an amount dependent on what work 
happens to be available on the shift.  For any taxi, the five entities may be the same, or 
different, or any one of the combinations in between. Whilst in many other fleets there may 
be a clear, if not always adequate, chain of responsibility and a hierarchical structure, the taxi 
industry is best considered a series of interrelated and overlapping entities.  A study of a more 
simple hierarchical fleet organization, such as Swedish Televerket (Gregersen, Brehmer, & 
Moren, 1996), may not be applicable in the context of Queensland’s taxi organisation.  In 
Swedish Televerket training activities to improve safety, were undertaken by drivers as part 
of their paid work, and paid for by the company.  For Queensland taxi drivers such training is 
inevitably in their own time and at their own expense.   
Drivers vary greatly in the income they earn, typically they may clear about $10 to 
$14 per hour, which is quite low by Australian pay rates (Queensland Department of 
Industrial Relations & Queensland Transport, 2001). The generally low rates of pay may 
encourage drivers to sacrifice safety as they attempt to maximise income by speeding and 
working long hours, about 50 to 60 hours per week (Dalziel & Job, 1997; Queensland 
Department of Industrial Relations & Queensland Transport, 2001).  The result is that fatigue 
may be a potential problem among taxi drivers, but past studies have found limited evidence 
to support this contention (Dalziel & Job, 1997; Koh, Ong, and Phoon, 1986).  
Strictly speaking, taxi drivers do not have a supervisor they are answerable too.  
Where and how they work is up to the driver.  They are quite at liberty not to take jobs that 
are advised over the dispatch system, and at peak times such as Friday and Saturday nights 
most drivers prefer to work busy ranks than to accept bookings for passengers that may not 
turn up or not wait for them.  Whilst taxi drivers have a high level of independence, they may 
have a depot manager or taxi owner who expects minimum levels of pay-ins.  There are 
agreed ways in which fares and costs are split between depots or owners and drivers, and in 
the event of crashes or customer complaints drivers may be talked to or reassessed by the 
owner, depot staff, or the taxi company.  Depot managers or taxi owners may refuse to hire a 
vehicle to a driver, or the driver can quite easily find someone else to drive for.  Another 
factor is that taxi drivers are exempt from wearing seat belts, the justification being that seat 
belts could be used as a weapon by aggressive passengers.   Also, there are some additional 
distractions for taxi drivers compared to most drivers: passengers who are usually unknown 
to them (Regan & Mitsopoulos, 2001), and the dispatch and communications systems 
(Bylund, Bjornstig, & Larsson, 1997; Dalziel & Job, 1997).   
 
Initial data collection 
Qualitative Data  
Qualitative data collection has been based on interviews with depot and company 
managers, focus groups with drivers, and discussions with individual drivers.  Focus groups 
have not been as formal as is common for other groups of participants: Taxi drivers often 
work 10 to 12 hour shifts, and while changeover may nominally be at 4pm, it will often go 
for more than an hour.  Drivers who finish early do not want to have to wait for late-arriving 
drivers before discussing road safety and other issues.  There were similar problems for 
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drivers beginning their shift; as soon as their car arrived they wanted to be on the road 
earning a living.  Thus, there was often a rolling membership of focus groups.   
Drivers proposed that safe driving behaviours included paying attention and being 
aware of the road surrounds, for example, “be psychic, see four cars ahead”; using turn 
indicators; and not taking personal problems onto the road.  Drivers said that factors that 
increased the likelihood of crashes were: fatigue because of long shifts, pressure from 
passengers, pedestrians wandering across the road, driving too fast, tailgating, or generally 
being in a rush, and poor training or screening of drivers at intake.   A number of Brisbane 
drivers reported that police were pedantic in applying traffic laws rather than being interested 
in road safety and customer service, and there was a reluctance to help the police.  This was a 
contrast to a regional area where police were much more cooperative, for example, letting 
cabs with no passengers speed back to ranks on busy nights, and drivers were much more 
willing to cooperate with police requests.   
Whereas drivers had concerns about police, managers had similar concerns about 
Queensland Transport.  Yet, while one manager complained that Queensland Transport 
enforced low fares, thus forcing drivers to rush and drive long hours, another said the 
problem was that too much money was taken out of the industry by taxi license holders.  
Some depot managers joined drivers in expressing concern about drivers who speed, tailgate, 
or are generally in a rush. Both drivers and managers had concerns about the apparent lack of 
training and rigorous assessment of new taxi drivers.  One depot paid for driver training 
courses attended by their drivers, but other managers thought such a move was not cost-
effective because of the high turnover of drivers.  In fact, there were limited suggestions for 
improving road safety in the taxi industry, with some managers saying nothing could be done.  
All depots regularly had basic maintenance checks of cabs, usually at the end of each shift.  
Additionally, various systems were employed to have drivers report faults at the end of each 
shift, or earlier if the need arose.  Yet some drivers preferred to drive a vehicle that had low 
oil level, despite the danger to the engine, rather than immediately report the fault to the 
depot and thus lose time and income.  A number of depot managers and a taxi owner believed 
drivers needed to take responsibility for their driving actions, despite the majority of depots 
requiring drivers who crashed pay a higher insurance levy for each shift, or to pay some of 
the repair costs.  There was also concern about “cowboys”, and connections were drawn 
between drivers who treated their customers well, what is termed customer focus, and safe 
drivers.  There was some disagreement about whether fatigue was an issue.  While taxi 
drivers have shifts up to 12 hours, or longer, rather than drive on monotonous rural highways 
they drive in an changing urban environment with a variety of passengers.  A number of these 
issues will be taken up later, particularly in terms of developing the questionnaire. 
 
Quantitative Data  
Types of Taxi Crashes in Queensland.  Table 1 lists the number and rate of different 
categories of crashes over two 6-month periods. The category with the largest number of 
crashes for all cars is where vehicles are travelling in the same direction along the same road.  
Taxis have an even higher rate of this type of crash, due to a higher rate of rear-end crashes 
compared to other cars.  These rear-end crashes are likely to be caused by factors mentioned 
by drivers and managers themselves, speed, following too close, and a lack of attention.  
Pedestrian crashes are more common for taxis than other cars: According to taxi drivers this 
is due to the peak periods on Friday and Saturday nights, and into the following mornings.  
At these times taxis converge on busy ranks near night clubs and other entertainment places, 
where people who are affected by alcohol or other drugs congregate, walk along or across 
roads, or dash out to hail a passing taxi.   
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Table 1 
Number of crashes where taxis or other cars are involved according to Queensland 
Transporta crash description for the period April to September 2003 and 2004. 
DCA Category  Apr – Sept 2004 Apr – Sept 2003 
   
% of taxi 
crashes 
% of all 
car crash 
% of taxi 
crashes 
% of all 
car crash 
00nb Pedestrian  7.6 3.0 11.5 3.5
10n Veh's adjacent approach 22.9 18.2 22.0 18.5
20n Veh's opposite approach 16.7 15.1 12.4 15.2
30n Veh's same direction  41.4 32.1 39.0 32.6
40n Veh's manoeuvring  5.2 4.5 4.1 3.9
50n Veh's overtaking  0.0 1.2 1.8 1.3
60n Veh's on path  1.4 4.2 1.8 4.5
70n Off-path-straight  3.3 12.8 4.1 12.2
80n Off-path-curve  0.0 8.3 1.4 7.9
90n Pass & Misc  1.4 0.6 1.8 0.5
 Total percentage  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
 Total number  210 8976 218 9095
301 Veh's same direction rear-end 25.7 17.6 26.1 18.0
30n-301 Veh's same direction not rear-end 15.7 14.5 12.8 14.6
Notes.  aThe Queensland Government transport department. bCrashes involving pedestrians 
are coded from 000 to 009, with similar coding for other categories.  
 
Severity of crashes.  The severity of reported taxi crashes are listed in Table 2.  There 
was just one fatality among taxi crashes in the 6-month period, more often there would be no 
fatalities.  The low fatality rate is at least partly explained by taxis being driving mostly over 
low speed urban roads.  However, taxis have higher rates of hospitalisation and injuries 
requiring medical treatment, particular in the more congested southeast region of Queensland.  
The marked difference between severity of taxi and other car crashed outside southeast 
Queensland is likely due to other cars being driven on rural roads and highways, whereas 
taxis are largely confined to towns and regional cities with slower speeds than rural roads, but 
not the congestion of southeast Queensland. 
 
Table 2 
Number of crashes where taxis or other cars are involved according to Queensland 
Transport for the period April to September 2004. 
  Percentage of all taxi crashes Percentage of all other car crashes 
 SE Qld Other Qld All Qld SE Qld Other Qld All Qld 
Fatal crashes 0.6 0.0 0.5 0.8 1.3 1.0
Hospitalisation 25.2 8.5 21.4 19.2 20.5 19.6
Medical treatment 27.0 25.5 26.7 23.7 19.1 22.2
Minor injury 11.0 21.3 13.3 15.3 11.4 14.0
Property damage only 36.2 44.7 38.1 41.0 47.8 43.2
Total percentage 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total crashes 163 47 210 6048 2929 8977
 
Contributing circumstances to crashes.  Queensland Transport data on contributing 
circumstances for April to September in 2003 and 2004 offer some explanation for the types 
of crashes.  The overrepresentation of taxis in intersection crashes may be due to an 
overrepresentation of intersection violations, such as disobeying traffic lights and give way 
signs.  A higher rate of violations involving following too closely, undue care and attention, 
and unsafe lane changes, helps to explain the higher rate of rear-end crashes. Undue care and 
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attention could be due to a multitude of possible distractions, for example, the computer 
dispatch system, unfamiliar passengers, and reading street maps.  Taxi drivers’ claims to 
mitigating circumstance in regard to pedestrian crashes receives some support in that only 
rarely did taxi drivers have “failing to give way on pedestrian crossing” assigned as a cause.  
The driving experience of taxi drivers, and their familiarity with the roads, is demonstrated by 
being less likely to have inexperience or driving conditions (glare, wet roads) as contributing 
circumstances.  The contributing circumstances data suggests that the factors of intersections 
violations (disobeying traffic lights and intersection signs), distraction, and close following 
are particularly relevant. 
 
Table 3 
Contributing circumstances to taxi and other car crashes for April to September of 2003 and 
2004. 
 
 Percentage of crash circumstances listed 
Circumstancesa April to September 2003 April to September 2004 
 % taxi 
circumstances 
% car 
circumstances 
% taxi 
circumstances 
% car 
circumstances 
Taxis overrepresented     
Disobey give way sign 7.39 5.35 6.14 5.17 
Disobey traffic lights 5.99 1.64 8.19 2.95 
Disobey traffic sign 0.00 0.44 1.71 0.52 
Follow too closely 6.69 5.16 8.19 4.95 
Improper turn (not U) 2.82 1.73 0.34 0.43 
Improper U-turn 2.11 1.22 3.41 1.05 
Turn in face of oncoming 
traffic 
5.28 5.92 7.17 5.59 
Undue care & attention 22.54 20.14 21.50 20.79 
Unsafe lane change 2.46 1.13 1.71 1.22 
Inattention/negligence 3.17 1.12 3.75 1.18 
Other cars overrepresented     
Alcohol - over the limitb 1.41 4.18 3.41 4.21 
Age (lack of perception, 
power…) 
1.76 2.23 2.05 4.21 
Fatigue related by definition 0.70 1.10 0.00 1.26 
Inexperience/lack of 
expertise 
8.10 13.81 9.56 12.86 
Medical condition (heart 
attack) 
0.00 1.08 1.02 1.11 
Sunlight glare 0.70 1.09 0.00 1.25 
Wet/slippery road 0.70 3.72 1.37 3.21 
Animal on road 0.35 0.27 0.00 1.35 
Excessive speed 0.70 2.36 0.68 2.27 
Total number 284 13 746 293 14 115 
Notes.  aOnly circumstances where the difference between taxis and other cars is greater than 
1% for at least one period of time are listed.  bTaxi drivers have a stricter BAC limit, thus 
may be other car drivers with BAC equal to that of taxi drivers, but not caught because below 
BAC = .05% rather than no alcohol. 
 
Preliminary questionnaire results.  A preliminary QTDQ was trialed among taxi 
drivers in November 2004, with 43 questionnaires completed at a return rate of about 45%.  
Taxi drivers who reported disregarding the speed limit on residential streets were more likely 
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to crash (r = .50, p < .01) and to have incurred demerit points (r = .40, p < .01).  While these 
results provide evidence that speed cameras and other enforcement measures are valid, other 
results suggest ways of expanding on the factor of speed.  Taxi drivers who try to get their 
passenger to a destination on time regardless of the road rules, are more likely to crash (r = 
.38, p < .05), as are drivers who believe it acceptable to take a risk overtaking (r = .35, p < 
.05), and who believe there are not enough driver to do the work (r = .45, p < .01).  By 
contrast, taxi drivers who give safety of passengers a priority appeared to be less likely to 
crash, a result in line with Lajunen and Summala (1995), though it did not reach significance 
(r = -.30, p = .06).  Thus it can be argued that taxi drivers who had a sense of urgency and 
seem to be in haste, and so will speed and tailgate, are more likely to crash than drivers who 
want their passengers to feel safe.   
 
Summary of Initial Data Collection  
 In terms of driving behaviour, a major concern of drivers and managers was speed, 
tailgating, rushing, and inattention.  Queensland Transport data demonstrated that taxis are 
overrepresented in rear end crashes, as well as pedestrian and some types of intersection 
crashes; and that taxis were overrepresented in disobeying intersection lights and signs, close 
following, and inattention.  Finally, preliminary survey results clearly demonstrate that 
intentionally speeding, and trying to meet passenger deadlines, is associated with crashes.  
This evidence points to drivers who fail to pay attention to the driving task, and those who 
rush, and so speed, tailgate, or fail to obey intersection rules, are more likely to crash.  There 
is anecdotal evidence that taxi drivers rush in an attempt to increase income.  The new 
version of the QTDQ specifically includes this issue as a potential organizational pressure on 
taxi drivers.  Clearly, organizational factors must be included in a systematic way. 
 
Theoretical Issues 
Theory of Planned Behaviour 
The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB, Ajzen, 1985, 1991) was developed from the 
Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA, Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).  The 
success of the TRA in finding significant relationships between attitudes and behaviour was 
due to the inclusion of intentions, and an insistence on a correspondence between the 
attitudes, intentions, and behaviours being measured.  Fishbein and Ajzen made the 
assumption that most socially relevant behaviour is under the control of the person 
concerned, therefore intentions determine behaviour.  Intentions could be predicted by the 
person’s attitude toward the behaviour, and their subjective norms.  Subjective norms are 
what the person perceives the beliefs of significant others toward the behaviour is, and their 
motivation to comply with such beliefs: A taxi driver may think other taxi drivers believe 
speeding is dangerous, but because they have no motivation to comply with other taxi drivers, 
they intend to speed anyway.  Attitudes to a behaviour are formed from the person’s beliefs 
about the outcomes of a behaviour and their evaluation of those outcomes: A taxi driver may 
believe that seatbelts will reduce injury in a crash, but can also be used as a weapon by a 
disgruntled passenger, whether the driver intends to wear the seatbelt will depend on their 
evaluation of these competing beliefs. 
To be able to find significant relationships, there must be a correspondence in what is 
measured between subjective norms and attitudes, intentions, and behaviours (Ajzen & 
Fishbein, 1980).  If the behaviour to be measured is which party the person will vote for at 
the next state election, then intentions, attitudes, and subjective norms must also relate to that 
particular behaviour.  If the attitude measured is that safe driving is important, that may have 
little relevance to particular driving behaviours.  Asking the driver whether they drive safely 
is not helpful.  The driver may believe they can safely drive even when they drive at 120 
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km/h in a 100 zone, and thus will willingly speed on a highway.  Driving safely is a 
behavioural category rather than a behaviour.  There will be several, maybe many possible 
behaviours, within the one category, rarely will a person undertake all those behaviours 
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980).  However, it may be possible to measure how much a person 
undertakes safe driving by measuring how frequently they undertake a range of specific 
driving behaviours. 
Safe driving behaviours suggests a measure of outcomes, in particular, decreased 
crash rates.  Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) warn against confusing behaviours with outcomes.  
The outcome of a person losing 10kg may be because of dieting behaviour, or because of 
increased exercise behaviour, a new job involving increased physical activity, other members 
of the family refusing to buy fatty foods, or other factors.  It is appropriate to identify the 
driving behaviours that are associated with a lower crash rate, but there are also many other 
factors including road conditions, traffic conditions, weather, health, and the condition of the 
car.  Crash rates can be used to identify which driving behaviours of taxi drivers are relatively 
safe or dangerous, and drivers measured on those behaviours, but because of the numerous 
other factors, prediction of which drivers will have crashes is difficult. 
 While external factors have an influence on intentions, and thus behaviour, Ajzen and 
Fishbein (1980) argue that these influences are always via attitudes and subjective norms.  
External factors are those external to the model, not to the person, and can include age, 
education level, sex, ethnicity, and training.  Being young in itself does not make one a less 
safe driver, but young people are more likely to have certain attitudes and subjective norms 
which are associated with more dangerous driving intentions.  For example, most people 
drive more safely when they have passengers in the car, the main exception being young men 
who have young men as passengers (Chen, Baker, Braver, & Li, 2000; Regan & Mitsopoulos, 
2001; Rueda-Domingo et al., 2004; Vollrath, Meilinger, & Kruger, 2002): This suggests that 
particular subjective norms that lead to more dangerous driving become more salient for 
young male drivers when fellow young males are passengers. 
Ajzen (1985; 1991) removed the assumption that most socially relevant behaviour is 
under the control of the person concerned when he developed the TPB.  The TRA became a 
special case of the TPB: When the behaviour was under complete volitional control, then 
there was no need for the new factor introduced to create the TPB.  The new factor, perceived 
behavioural control (PBC), was hypothesized to affect behaviour, both directly and via 
intentions (see Figure 1).  PBC is most closely related to self-efficacy (Ajzen, 1991).  
However, it refers to more than the skills of the person to perform the behaviour, but rather 
their ability to control their performance of the behaviour given their skills and other 
limitations in the environment.   
 
See Appendix for Figure 1  
 
A meta-analysis (Armitage & Conner, 2001) brought together the results of 185 tests 
of the TPB found in 161 articles.  Overall, attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived 
behavioural control accounted for 39% of the variance in intentions, whilst intentions and 
perceived behavioural control accounted for 27% of variance in behaviour.  Attitudes were 
the strongest predictor of intentions, and subjective norms the weakest.  One explanation for 
the low result for subjective norms is that in many studies they are measured by a single item.  
Indeed, Armitage and Conner (2001) found that when subjective norms were measured by 
multiple items, subjective norms then correlated more strongly with intentions.  Behaviours 
were more strongly predicted when they were self-reported than when the behaviour was 
observed.  Part of the reason may be that when participants answer questionnaires they want 
to be consistent, and so tend to answer questions on behaviour in line with other questions.  
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Additionally, answering questions on intentions, behaviours, and then other factors in what is 
perceived to be a socially acceptable way will increase the likelihood of strong correlations 
between the answers.  Observing behaviour may be more objective, and was used in one 
study of taxi driver behaviour where observers posed as passengers (Burns & Wilde, 1995).  
However, observation can have problems in cost, time sampling errors, and the reaction of 
participants to being observed.  
 
TPB Applied to Road Environment 
Parker and her colleagues (Parker, Manstead, Stradling, Reason, & Baxter, 1992) used 
self-report measures to find evidence of whether the TPB was applicable in the road 
environment.  They found that perceived behavioural control improved the prediction of 
driving intentions.  There was no attempt to measure actual behaviour, thus it could not be 
confirmed that driving intention resulted in the behaviour intended, and it could not be 
assessed if perceived behavioural control had a direct effect on behaviour.  Contrary to the 
general trend, Parker et al. found that the strongest predictor of intent was subjective norm.  
The reason for this strong result is unclear.  Subjective norms were best at predicting the 
intentions of younger male drivers: this is in line with results of studies that found passengers 
had more influence over young males rather than any other group of drivers (Chen et al., 
2000; Regan & Mitsopoulos, 2001; Rueda-Domingo et al., 2004; Vollrath et al., 2002).  This 
would only partly explain the strength of the subjective norm results.  The study seems to 
have been sound with a large sample size (over 800).   
Other studies in the road safety area have, contrary to Parker et al (1992), found 
subjective norms to be the weakest of the predictors for intentions and behaviours.  The TPB 
was used as a basis for a mass media campaign to reduce speeding (Stead, Tagg, 
MacKintosh, & Eadie, 2005).  Elliot, Armitage, and Baughan (2003) used self-reports of 
future speeding behaviour by administering the behaviour questionnaire three months after 
the questionnaire measuring the other TPB variables.  They found that after demographic 
variables were taken account of, attitude, subjective norms, and PBC accounted for about 
53% of variance in behavioural intentions, whilst intentions and PBC accounted for about 
32% of variance in future behaviour.  A study of speeding behaviour (Aberg, Larsen, Glad, & 
Beilinsson, 1997) adjusted TRA by including the social environment, that is, drivers 
perception of how fast other drivers went.  Subjective norms were not measured.  Support 
was found for this variation of the TRA  (Aberg et al., 1997).  However, it can be argued that 
perception of how fast other drivers went is a subjective norm based on observation.  In the 
TPB both subjective norm and PBC enable the researcher to investigate influences from 
outside the participant.  However, those influences, whether it be observation of the 
behaviour of other drivers, demands from a supervisor, or advise from a family member, 
must be perceived, interpreted and given weight by the participant.   
 
TPB and Taxi Road Safety 
Figure 2 is a diagrammatic presentation of applying the TPB to taxi road safety.  The 
standard TPB precursors to attitudes, subjective norms, and PBC are not included.  However, 
some factors that are expected to predict PBC are included, in particular perceptions of 
pressure from the organizational and road environments.  These are included to measure how 
much organizational factors influence taxi drivers, rather than to find a comprehensive list of 
factors that affect PBC.  The TPB has also been extended by having behaviour predicting the 
outcome of crash rates.  There will be many factors involved in crash rates besides the 
driving behaviour of the taxi driver, for example, the behaviour of other drivers and problems 
with a vehicle or the road.  These factors will not be measured.   
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See Appendix for Figure 2  
 
The operational definition of unsafe driving behaviours is those driving behaviours 
associated with higher levels of crashes.  An alternative would be to base unsafe behaviour on 
the level of at-fault crashes, because if the driver is not at-fault, then the driver’s behaviour 
was not implicated in the crash (af Wahlberg, 2003).  However, attribution of fault is a 
policing, legal, and insurance issue, and may not truly reflect who was actually at fault in 
terms of driving behaviour.  An example would be a taxi being hit by a car that failed to obey 
a give way sign.  While the police and insurance companies will assign fault to the other car, 
it could be that the taxi driver should have been more alert to the offending car and taken 
evasive action.   Additionally, crashes are fairly rare, which means ruling out not-at-fault 
crashes may mean the sample size of crashes becomes too small.  As was demonstrated 
above, unsafe driving behaviours include speed, close following, disobeying traffic lights and 
signs, fatigue, failure to avoid pedestrians, and distraction and inattention.  Each of these 
driving behaviours will be measured for each TPB factor.  In this way some of the 
complexity of driving behaviour can be captured, as well as making it possible to isolate 
some of the elements of driving behaviour important to the taxi industry.   
 
Feedback 
As well as investigating current road safety in the taxi industry, this project is to 
assess technological based interventions designed to improve road safety.  The proposed 
technology utilizes feedback to drivers. Interventions using technology to provide the basis of 
feedback has been trialed before.  In Belgium and the Netherlands, either accident data 
recorders or journey data recorders were introduced to seven fleets (Wouters & Bos, 2000).  
Change in crash risk ranged from an increase of a statistically nonsignificant 13% for a truck 
fleet to a decrease of 72% for a bus fleet. Wouters and Bos found a significant overall 
reduction in crash risk of 20% when compared to control groups.  There are, however, a 
number of difficulties with this study.  The small sample sizes and the variable crash records 
inflated confidence intervals.  Feedback, which was the responsibility of fleet owners, was 
not controlled in the experiment, and the nature of the feedback was not clarified.  This taxi 
project will differ in its use of a technology based feedback intervention by having the 
assessor present in the car, and having greater control of the feedback. 
An investigation that more rigorously controlled feedback sessions based on data 
logger information was carried out by Sheahan and Biggs (2005).  Participants were trainee 
bus drivers who were assigned to three groups, data logger with camera, data logger without 
camera, and control.  Some of the results were confounded by ceiling effects.  The trend was 
that the data logger without the camera was beneficial; however, the results were not 
statistically significant, with the small sample size being one of the possible reasons. Another 
reason may be that the feedback provided by the data logger related to higher order driving 
competencies, and thus was not applicable to trainee bus drivers.  
Control of feedback is necessary because the type of feedback, and the medium of the 
feedback, impacts on its efficacy (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996).  In a series of university and 
workplace based experiments Baron (1988) confirmed that constructive feedback was 
specific, prompt, and considerate. The constructive feedback reduced conflict, whilst 
destructive criticism undermined the recipients confidence, self-efficacy, and future 
performance, but increased avoidance behaviours.  Feedback that is specific will indicate 
where the recipient has done well or poorly at the relevant task, this allows the recipient to 
know where good work can be consolidated, and what improvements can be made.  The 
alternative is generalizations such as “You have done well” or “that is a poor piece of work”.  
Considerate feedback is when the needs and feelings of the recipient are taken into account 
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when the feedback is given.  Considerate feedback will keep to the issue of performance 
rather than to denigrate (or overly praise) the recipient. 
An experiment by Liden and Mitchell (1985), that measured the reactions of 
university students to exam feedback, found that recipients rated specific feedback more 
positively than nonspecific feedback.  Students who received a maximum of three pieces of 
information attributing poor results to internal causes had significantly lower intentions to 
study in the future than students who received fewer attributions of internal cause.  Liden and 
Mitchell suggest there may be a point at which recipients give up if they receive too much 
feedback that attributes failure to internal causes, but they were unwilling to specify a level 
based on an experimental study.  However, a related issue here is that constructive feedback 
will be considerate of how much negative feedback, and the sort of negative feedback, that 
recipients may be able to positively respond to.  
Two other dimensions of feedback are its sign and its credibility.  Positive feedback 
may make the person feel successful, but it is negative feedback that improves the 
performance of the recipient (Podsakoff & Farh, 1989), this is particularly so when the 
feedback has higher credibility.  In an experiment using university students Podaskoff and 
Farh had manipulated credibility by saying the feedback was based on the evaluators 
experience, or by displaying tables indicating the feedback was based on a comparison to 300 
students who had completed the same test.  The high credibility data based feedback resulted 
in greater improvement in performance and the setting of higher goals, than the low 
credibility feedback that was based on opinion. 
The medium of feedback can be divided into either human or computer, with the 
human medium being supervisor, peers, or subordinates.  Kluger and Adler (1993) provided 
feedback via either a computer or a human, either on request or automatically, to university 
students solving math problems.  All feedback reduced performance, with the feedback from 
the human having the most negative effect.  However, the smaller negative effect for 
feedback provided through the computer may be because of convenience, the students were 
working on computers.  Additionally, feedback was only about outcome, whether the student 
answered the question correctly or not.  Process feedback, that is, feedback on how to go 
about the particular task, may yield quite different results.  Whereas a person telling a subject 
whether they were right and wrong may simply decrease self-esteem, a person explaining to 
another person how to complete a task successfully can conceivably improve performance. 
A number of the issues in regard to feedback have been brought together in a recent 
study by Alder and Ambrose (2005).  They hypothesized that subject control over the timing 
of the feedback, the medium of the feedback, and the constructive nature of the feedback, 
would effect perceived fairness of the monitoring (see figure 3).  Monitoring fairness would 
effect both task performance and task satisfaction.  Alder and Ambrose had 165 university 
students enter catalogue orders into a computer system, incentives were provided for 
increased input of orders.   There was no evidence that control over the timing of the 
feedback improved perceived fairness, but this may have been due to the short nature of the 
task (2 hours) limiting the worth of such control.  Also, no evidence supported the proposed 
interaction between the medium and the constructiveness of the feedback.  Constructiveness 
had a large effect on monitoring fairness (Beta = 0.79) and feedback medium had a moderate 
effect (Beta = .34).  The result in regard to medium is of particular interest.  In this case the 
feedback came either direct from the computer, or via the supervisor.  Alder and Ambrose 
were concerned that the presence of the supervisor would magnify the negative effect of 
destructive criticism.  It turned out that using a supervisor to provide the feedback improved 
the constructive criticism, but had a small positive effect in terms of destructive criticism.  It 
may be the advantage of face to face feedback is that the recipient can respond to the 
supervisor, either by offering some excuse or explanation for poor performance, or to voice 
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disapproval of the feedback.  The Alder and Ambrose study, and many of the others 
discussed above, used university students as participants in experiments, and thus the results 
may not translate to other populations in industry outside education.  Nevertheless, Alder and 
Ambrose do provide some support for using supervisors to provide computer generated 
feedback in regard to performance, whilst Wouters and Bos (2000) and Sheahan and Biggs 
(2005), which were based on worker or trainee samples, provide support for the use of 
feedback with commercial drivers.   
 
See Appendix for Figure 3  
 
Current and Future Directions for the Project 
Queensland Taxi Driver Questionnaire 
Table 4 summarizes the QTDQ sections and how they relate to the TPB, and the 
frequency that particular driving behaviours are measured in each section.  Except for in 
section A, most questions utilize Likert scales, asking for response by either strength of 
agreement, frequency, or strength of influence.  Questions were taken from a number of other 
scales, as well as developed particularly for this project.  Because of unique features of the 
taxi industry the wording of many questions that did come from other scales had to be 
adjusted: For example, any questions that referred to drivers as employees had to be changed 
as taxi drivers are self-employed. 
 
Table 4 
The sections of the QTDQ with the number of questions for relevant driving behaviours. 
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A – Demographic and 
driving history 
26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 21 
B – Perceived 
behavioural controla 
8 0 2 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
C – Driving behavioura 38 5 3 1 0 1 1 0 3 3 4 4 13 
D – Security 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
E – Training 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 
F – Driving intentionsa 15 1 2 2 0 1 1 0 1 1 2 1 3 
G – Driving and work 
attitudesa 
27 1 4 4 0 1 1 0 1 1 2 0 12 
H – Subjective normsa 24 2 2 2 0 4 2 0 2 2 2 0 6 
I – Perceived demands 
on driving 
14 0 2 1 4 2 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 
J - Conclusion 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Total 168 9 15 11 4 10 6 4 14 8 11 5 71 
Note. aSections directly related to the TPB.  
 
Demographic and driving history.  In the driving history section drivers are asked to 
self-report how many crashes they have had in the previous 12 months.  Arthur Jr. et al. 
(2001) compared the use of self-report crash data to that collected by a transport department 
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through the police.  Many crashes are not reported to the police for reasons that include the 
crash being under a minimum value for mandatory reporting, and the participants choosing 
not to report the crash.  Of those crashes that were reported there may be inaccuracies in the 
information: For example, participants may not want to incriminate themselves.  Arthur Jr. et 
al. compared the state department’s crash and traffic violation records of 394 participants, to 
their self-reports. Participants self-reported, on average, about three times the number of 
crashes than was recorded and four times the number of violations.  Arthur Jr. et al. noted that 
the boundary conditions on archival data make that data different to self-report data.  If the 
research interest is in severe crashes, then archival data will be the most accurate.  If the 
interest is all crashes for the relevant drivers, as for this taxi study, then self-report data are 
more appropriate.  Some items in this section ask for a short answer, for example: 
Approximately how many hours did you work taxi shifts last week?  Other items involved 
ticking one of several possible answers, for example: I most often drive: day shift…, night 
shift…, about the same of each….  A question with a series of scenarios for what the driver 
does when tired (e.g., end your shift early) had a Likert scale from 0 = never to 5 = always. 
Perceived behavioural control.   This section measures drivers’ perception of how 
easily they can undertake certain driving activities.  It was originally based on questions from 
another taxi study (Dalziel & Job, 1997) on optimism bias.  However, there are problems 
with measuring optimism bias, in particular, the ambiguity of average (Groeger & Grande, 
1996).  Additionally, the questions needed to be adjusted to be more suitable to the taxi 
industry, for example by specifying speeding on urban streets, and including interaction with 
pedestrians.   Questions were further adjusted to fit the PBC concept in the TPB.  Versions of 
the questions were trialled with drivers.  Published PBC questions in the road safety domain 
cover a limited range of behaviours, for example, speed (Stead et al., 2005) and violations 
(Parker et al., 1992), the questions in terms of ease or difficulty one has in avoiding (or 
performing) various activities.  Thus, the PBC questions in the QTDQ have been developed 
specifically for the project.  The items were answered on a Likert scale ranging from 1 = very 
easy to 6 = very difficult. 
 Driving behaviour.  Crashes are relatively rare: an alternative measure of success is a 
reduction in unsafe driving behaviour, such as speeding and running red lights, and an 
increase in safe driving behaviour.  Drivers can be asked to self-report on their driving 
behaviour.  This is the preferable method, despite possibilities of poor recall and social 
desirability effects, because a variety of specific behaviours of interest to this study can be 
measured, rather than the particular traffic laws that police enforce.  Never-the-less, the 
self-reporting of demerit points may provide a rough overall estimate of speeding and other 
driving violations. 
Questions in regard to driving behaviour have been developed from the Driving 
Behaviour Questionnaire (Blockey & Hartley, 1995; Parker, Reason, Manstead, & Stradling, 
1995; Reason, Manstead, Stradling, Baxter, & Campbell, 1990).  The DBQ has been 
modified for the fleet questionnaire at the Centre of Accident Research and Road Safety, 
Queensland (CARRS-Q) to simplify a number of the questions and to make it more 
applicable to the fleet setting.  Further modification has been made to make it applicable to 
the taxi industry.  Thus, “Park on a double yellow line and risk a fine” has become “Park or 
pick up a passenger in a clearway (or similar)”.  “Do paperwork or other admin while 
driving” was first written into the CARRS-Q fleet questionnaire, whilst “Quickly do U-turns 
or cut across traffic to pick up or drop off a passenger” was created for this study.  When the 
original questionnaire was trialed 36 of the 50 questions had a score less than one (Reason et 
al., 1990), this skewness may be alleviated by adjustments made to the questions.  The DBQ 
has a test-retest reliability of 0.78 (Parker et al., 1995).  The items were scored on a scale very 
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similar to the original DBQ, ranging from 0 = never to 5 = always (rather than the “nearly 
always” of the DBQ). 
Security.  The categories of abuse potentially received by drivers were based on an 
earlier study on security in the Victorian taxi industry (Haines, 1997).  The scale used was 
developed for the preliminary QTDQ and produced results in line with expectations: Fare 
evasion and verbal abuse was experienced a few times a year, more serious abuse was 
generally experienced less than once a year.  While this is not part of the proposed model, 
and security may have a limited relationship to road safety, there were two reasons to include 
the questions.  Security from passengers is an important issue for drivers, thus the questions 
and the results have great interest to the drivers and the industry as a whole.  Additionally, 
security cameras were introduced into taxis in Brisbane as the questionnaire was going out, 
the results of this section can form baseline data to help measure the success of the security 
camera program.  A Likert scale ranging from 0 = Never, through 3 = about once a month, to 
6 = several times a shift, produced appropriate results in the preliminary survey.   
Training.  There are two purposes to this short section of the questionnaire.  The first 
is to discover if drivers found initial training useful, both in regard to both road safety and 
security from aggressive passengers.  The second reason is to find out how many drivers 
undertake subsequent training.  Discussions with industry members suggest this will be a 
limited number of drivers, except perhaps for those who have been to a taxi council video and 
talk session at their depot, and as such there is likely to be little effect on road safety 
behaviours or outcomes.  There is a mixture of Likert scale and short answer questions in this 
section. 
Intentions.   Victoir, Eertmans, Van den Bergh, and Van den Broucke (2005) 
measured intentions using questions that were quite general, for example: “I intend to pay 
special attention to minding the traffic rules.”  A questionnaire developed for fleets by 
CARRS-Q proved more helpful.  Of the 15 questions in the QTDQ, 12 come from the 
CARRS-Q fleet questionnaire, though with some modification where necessary, for example: 
“Ensure that you do not drive for work if tired or fatigued” became “Ensure that you do not 
drive a taxi if tired or fatigued”.  A number of the CARRS-Q fleet questions that were not of 
high relevance to the taxi industry were culled to help prevent the QTDQ becoming too long, 
and to concentrate on the identified areas of speed, tailgating, intersection signs and lights, 
pedestrians, fatigue, and distraction.  Scoring is the same as for CARRS-Q fleet questionnaire 
(1 = never to 5 = always). 
Attitudes.  This section also drew heavily on the CARRS-Q fleet questionnaire, which  
was partly based on the Driver Attitude Questionnaire.  Again it was necessary to make 
changes and additions to ensure all identified taxi crash risks were accounted for, for 
example: “It is very important to continually lookout for pedestrians” was added because 
pedestrians were over-represented in taxi crashes.  Attitudes are scored from 1 = strongly 
disagree to 7 = strongly agree. 
The attitudes section also includes items not directly related to with road safety, in 
particular, items related to “intention to quit” and “service orientation”.  The two  “customer 
focus” questions (factor loadings of 0.87 and 0.74) from a service orientation scale (Kim, 
Leong, & Lee, 2005) were included in the current attitude section.  Customer focus questions 
were included because a number of depot managers and taxi drivers indicated there was a 
connection between drivers who kept clean cabs and tried to satisfy passengers, and safety.  
The preliminary survey found that drivers who thought customer safety was important had 
fewer crashes, but the drivers who tried to satisfy customer demands to meet tight schedules 
were more likely to crash.  Thus, competing customer demands may neutralize any effect of 
service orientation or customer focus on road safety.  Intention to quit (Lauver & Kristof-
Brown, 2001) questions were included in the preliminary questionnaire, with polarised results 
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showing many drivers either wanting to stay in the industry, or wanting to get out, with few 
drivers being neutral.  A bigger sample of drivers may help uncover possible relationships 
between intention to quit and driving behaviour, crash rates, and other factors. 
Subjective norms.  One measure of subjective norms used very general driving 
behaviours, for example: My friends drive safely (Victoir et al., 2005).  The items in the 
QTDQ were developed to include the identified taxi crash risks.  In both Victoir et al (2005) 
and Parker et al. (1992) close family members were included as a reference group, and there 
was no reason to doubt that close family was more likely than other groups to influence taxi 
drivers.  A second reference group that would be likely to influence taxi driver behaviour 
more than other groups is other taxi drivers.  Each item in this section was asked twice, once 
in regard to each reference group.  The questions were tested with a small number of drivers.  
The questions employ a Likert scale ranging from 1 = strongly discourage me from to 7 = 
strongly encourage me to.  
Perceived organizational and traffic demands.  This section was originally developed 
to measure PBC, but drivers found it confusing as it attempted to measure frequency of 
behaviour, control in regard to other groups, and competency, all at the same time.  These 
questions were then rewritten to focus on perceived demands placed on drivers by the taxi 
organization and road environment.  A sample question is “Police enforcement pressures me 
to obey the speed limit.”  Responses are given on a Likert scale ranging from 0 = not at all to 
5 = overwhelming.  Sources of pressure included are the taxi company, taxi owners or depot 
managers, police, financial needs, congested roads, and passengers.  A perception of being 
pressured will lower a driver’s PBC; thus there should be significant relationship between 
these items and the PBC items.  However, this section is also quite exploratory, whist drivers, 
managers and others talk about pressures on drivers, there is little in the literature that tries to 
quantify or define that pressure. 
 
Computer-based Driver Assessment 
Early in 2006 a magnetic pen operated computer used to assess drivers will be trialled 
with both novice and experienced taxi drivers.  The assessment tool is in the final stages of 
development by Vigil Systems; being modified for the taxi industry based on data, current 
assessment guidelines, and other information, provided by a taxi company in Brisbane and 
from this project.  The hardware consists of a tablet computer and a magnetic pen.  The 
computer can be connected to one or two cameras, a GPS receiver, and a motion sensor, or 
another combination of up to four devices.  Vigil Systems has developed software that 
enables an assessor to mark appropriate boxes as a driver is assessed.  If the driver is 
following too close then the assessor would mark “tailgating”, say, which may bring up a 
submenu of other responses that may be marked.  The computer will relate the responses of 
the assessor to the camera, GPS receiver, motion sensor, or other devices.  There is a variety 
of ways the data collected by the computer may be used.  It could be used to simply pass or 
fail a potential taxi driver: that would underutilize the device.  A printed report, including 
reasons why some driving behaviours are safe or dangerous, and how the driver may drive 
more safely, can be produced for the driver and other appropriate people.  To fully utilize the 
device, feedback to the driver will include information from all the sensors.  If a concern for a 
particular driver was tailgating, then showing appropriate camera images from the driving 
assessment, perhaps compared to images of safe following distances, could be included in the 
feedback to the driver. 
To increase the likelihood of the intervention being successful the feedback will need 
to be constructive, that is, specific, prompt, and considerate.  The Vigil Systems assessment 
tool will provide specific data on which constructive feedback can be based.  It is planned 
that the training manager, or driving assessor, of the taxi company will provide that feedback 
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to novice taxi drivers, or drivers who have been referred for reassessment.  There will be a 
point, which may not be reached, where a driver’s performance is so poor, that the driver will 
not be accepted by the taxi company.  Many drivers may have a few points at which their 
driving could be improved.  However, the drivers who come between these two groups, who 
may make safe taxi drivers when they are given training, will need the most considerate 
feedback.  In this case considerate feedback will be given with the attitude of: How can the 
performance of the driver best be improved to ensure they are safe taxi drivers?  Considerate 
feedback will include pointing out what specific safe driving behaviours are already being 
undertaken by the driver, as well as giving specific ways of improving on unsafe behaviours.  
Whilst constructive feedback is meant to be prompt, it may need to be staggered if there are 
several behaviours the driver needs to change to become a safe taxi driver.  There may also 
be a trade-off between promptness and consideration.  Giving the feedback immediately after 
the assessment does not allow consideration of what feedback should be given to the 
particular driver. 
Assessment of the intervention will be by questionnaire and interview.  Drivers will 
be asked to complete the intentions scale of the QTDQ and some other questions both before 
and after the assessment and feedback.  Experienced drivers being reassessed will also be 
asked to complete the attitude, subjective norm, and PBC sections both before and after the 
intervention.  Both groups of drivers will also be asked to rate the training itself.  The 
assessors will be interviewed before and after the intervention is trialed.  The first interview 
will centre on the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the present assessment system.  The 
second interview will concentrate on the Vigil Systems based feedback intervention, and a 
comparison of it to the present assessment system.  The intervention can be deemed as 
successful if intended driving behaviours move significantly towards safer driving, and if the 
assessors find the new system more helpful than the old in instilling safe driving behaviour. 
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Figure 1 
Diagrammatic representation of the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Stead, Tagg, MacKintosh, & Eadie, 2005)  
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Attitude 
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Figure 2  
Theory of Planned Behaviour modified for application to the driving behaviour of taxi drivers 
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Figure 3.  Hypothesised feedback model (Alder & Ambrose, 2005). 
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